

RESTRICTED
REPORT
OF
THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION
OF THE THEATER INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER
OF OPERATIONS

G-2 SECTION

64

STUDY NUMBER 14

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Organization And Operation Of The
Theater Intelligence Services
In The European Theater Of
Operations

Study #14

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THEATER INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF
OPERATIONS

MISSION: Prepare report and recommendation on the Theater Intelligence Services in the European Theater of Operations - its organization, operation, sources of information, contacts, and liaison with Allied and other intelligence services.

The General Board was established by General Orders 128, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945, and General Orders 312, dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the United States forces in the European Theater.

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THEATER INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF
OPERATIONS

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CHAPTER 1

THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AVAILABLE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

INTRODUCTION

The study of the intelligence services available to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF), as they existed on the final day of the war, 8 May 1945, is limited to the intelligence services of the major commands and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the European Theater of Operations. In scope, this chapter covers the relation of these intelligence services to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), the type of intelligence they furnished, and the method in which this intelligence was transmitted to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. In addition, there were American and British agencies in Washington and London which furnished intelligence to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. No discussion will be made of these agencies, but they will be listed in order to show the true perspective of intelligence services available to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

SECTION 1

THE MAJOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AVAILABLE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, ON 8 MAY 1945

1. The major intelligence services available to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, on the final day of the war in Europe, 8 May 1945, were as shown on Chart 1. These intelligence services were of two types.

a. Intelligence Services of the major commands:

- (1) 6, 12, and 21 Army Groups.
- (2) 2 British Tactical Air Force, 9 United States Air Force, and 1 United States Tactical Air Force (provisional).
- (3) Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Force (ANCXF).
- (4) Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA).
- (5) Headquarters, United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF).
- (6) Headquarters, Commander of the Navy in Europe (COMNAVEU).

b. Intelligence Services from outside agencies:

- (1) United States Departments and Agencies.
- (2) British Ministries and Agencies.

2. Control and coordination of intelligence services. The G-2 (Intel-

ligence) Division, the A-2 (Intelligence) Division of the Air Staff, and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, were the instruments of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, which controlled and coordinated the intelligence services listed in Paragraph 1 above. For a discussion of the G-2 Division of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, see Chapters 2 and 3. For a discussion of the A-2 Division of the Air Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, see Section 3, this Chapter.

3. a. The Joint Intelligence Committee was formed in order to provide the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, with coordinated air, ground, and naval intelligence.¹ Since the G-2 Division of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was primarily a ground intelligence agency,¹ representatives of air, ground, and naval intelligence met informally in the early spring of 1944 in order to provide the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, with coordinated intelligence.¹ On 5 June 1944, these meetings were put on a routine basis, and the resulting Joint Intelligence Committee met regularly thereafter.² It was composed of the following intelligence personnel:²

- (1) Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (The permanent chairman).
- (2) One representative from each of the three military services (air, navy, and ground) of both the United States and Great Britain.
- (3) An American or British member to deal with economic questions.
- (4) When required, an American member and a British member representing the political advisors to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- (5) A permanent Secretariat.

b. The mission of the Joint Intelligence Committee was:²

- (1) To prepare appreciations and notes on the current military situation to be submitted to the Planning Staff of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- (2) To keep under constant review the military and political situation in the area for which the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, was responsible.
- (3) To keep under constant review the general intelligence arrangements in the area of responsibility of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, inasmuch as they affected more than one service.

c. The Joint Intelligence Committee reported to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.² It was the sole source of intelligence appreciations available to the Planning Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

SECTION 2

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES ARMY

4. The G-2 (Intelligence) Division, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, was the staff agency which controlled, coordinated, and formulated the policy on matters of intelligence within the sphere of responsibility of the Commander, European Theater of Operations, United States Army.* One of the primary and most important functions of this intelligence division was the procurement, administration, training, and supply of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) specialist teams, which were assigned to and operated in Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and its subordinate commands.** An important source of information for the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, was that information supplied by the service branches (Ordnance, Engineer, etc) operating under Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army. Either when requested by the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, or in routine dissemination, the intelligence staff of each of these service branches supplied the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, with intelligence data and studies pertaining to its respective branch.

5. There were essentially three types of intelligence supplied to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, by the G-2 Division, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, or by the intelligence staffs of the service branches.

a. Engineer Intelligence. The intelligence section of the Office of the Engineer, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, produced trafficability maps, detailed study of the Rhine River, and various general studies of terrain.³

b. Technical Intelligence. The intelligence section of each branch of service in Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, such as the Ordnance Department and the Chemical Warfare Service, had an intelligence section that made special studies of enemy weapons and equipment.⁴

c. Counter Intelligence. The G-2 Division of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, provided the G-2 Division of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, with information of a counter-intelligence nature pertaining to the Communications Zone. However, this was for information only, since Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, was responsible for counter-intelligence in the Communications Zone.⁵

6. Transmission of intelligence to Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. Since there was no direct command relationship

* The sphere of responsibility of the Commander, European Theater of Operations, is covered in Study Number 2, Theater General Board, European Theater, on "Study of the Organization of the European Theater of Operations."

** Covered in Study Number 12, Theater General Board, European Theater, on "Military Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations--Procurement, Training, Supply, Administration, and Utilization of Intelligence Personnel."

between Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, the intelligence staffs of these headquarters depended largely upon mutual cooperation. In order to insure close coordination and to avoid duplication of effort, these staffs maintained close liaison with each other. The intelligence furnished the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, by the intelligence staffs of the service branches in the European Theater of Operations. United States Army, was coordinated by the G-2 Division, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army.⁴ As a practical expediency, the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, normally secured this intelligence by direct contact with the intelligence staff of each of the separate services.⁴

SECTION 3

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE ALLIED AIR FORCES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

7. The intelligence services of the Allied Air Forces in the European Theater of Operations available to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, were conducted by: (1) the intelligence staffs of the Air Ministry and the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, and (2) the Air Intelligence Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Inasmuch as the intelligence staffs of the Air Ministry and the United States Strategic Air Forces operated jointly, their intelligence services are discussed simultaneously in this study.

8. The intelligence services of the Air Ministry and the United States Strategic Air Forces.⁸ Due to the weakness of the United States air intelligence in the early stages of the war,* it was agreed that the British Air Ministry would supply the United States Air Forces in Europe with both operational and air target intelligence. Therefore, in accordance with this agreement, initially, the United States supplied liaison personnel to the various staff sections of the Air Ministry Intelligence. As the war progressed, however, the United States' participation in the production of air intelligence became so great that when the war in Europe ended, the intelligence sections of the Air Ministry and the United States Strategic Air Forces were, in effect, integrated staffs working as a unit and producing all the strategic air intelligence in the European Theater. The United States Strategic Air Forces maintained a liaison office in the Air Ministry which coordinated all requests from the various American agencies for strategic air intelligence. This liaison office, in conjunction with the various intelligence staff agencies in the Air Ministry, produced the required air intelligence studies.

a. Although the United States Strategic Air Forces were not always under the operational control of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, the intelligence staffs of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and Headquarters, United States Strategic Air Forces, continuously exchanged intelligence data, and coordinated with each other on matters of intelligence. The Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2 (Intelligence) of the United States Strategic Air Forces

* According to General Spaatz, American Military Intelligence was so "weak ... when I first came to England ... there were all sorts of vague guesses as to how strong the German Air Force was. Estimates ranged from 15,000 to 50,000 first line planes."⁸

participated in the meetings of the Joint Intelligence Committee of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (See paragraph 3, Section 1, Chapter 1), and the weekly air commanders' meetings at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Also, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was represented on the Combined Strategic Target Committee* established by the United States Strategic Air Forces and the Royal Air Force in October 1944.⁸

b. The A-2 Division, United States Strategic Air Force, supplied Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, with the following types of intelligence largely obtained through photographic reconnaissance: terrain, flak installations, condition of enemy communication system, intelligence concerning new types of enemy aircraft, and special strategic studies.⁶

c. The intelligence produced or gathered, by the A-2 Division, United States Strategic Air Forces, was transmitted to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, by the following methods:⁶

- (1) Through the Commander-in-Chief, United States Strategic Air Forces.
- (2) Through the Joint Intelligence Committee, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- (3) Through the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, of the Air Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- (4) Through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

9. The A-2 Division, Air Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, comprised the former Air Intelligence Division, Allied Expeditionary Air Force. When the latter headquarters was incorporated as the Air Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force in November 1944,** the A-2 Division remained separate from the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. The A-2 Division coordinated intelligence requirements of the tactical air forces operating in the European Theater of Operations and disseminated to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, intelligence received primarily from the Air Ministry and the United States Strategic Air Forces.⁷ It also disseminated to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the United States Strategic Air Forces, intelligence furnished by the 2 British Tactical Air Force, 1 United States

* The Combined Strategic Targets Committee was an advisory committee which met in London for the purpose of studying priorities of targets to be attacked by the British and American Strategic Air Forces. Industrialists as well as representatives from the staffs of the major commands in Europe were members of the Committee. The offices represented were: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force; Bomber Operations and Intelligence Directorates, Air Ministry; Operations and Intelligence Directorate, United States Strategic Air Forces; Enemy Branch; British Foreign Office; Ministry of Economic Warfare; Enemy Objectives Unit, United States Embassy, London.⁸

** Covered in Study Number 2, Theater General Board, European Theater, on "Study of the Organization of the European Theater of Operations."

Tactical Air Force (provisional), and the 9 United States Air Force, all under operational control of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

SECTION 4

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE NAVAL FORCES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

10. The intelligence services of the naval forces operating in the European Theater were controlled and coordinated by the intelligence staffs of the Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Force, and the Commander of the Navy in Europe, although the latter headquarters was established mainly for the supply and administration of the United States naval forces in Europe.

11. The Intelligence Staff, Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Force, coordinated its intelligence activities with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, through the establishment of the Naval Intelligence Sub-Division in the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. For further discussion on the Naval Intelligence Sub-Division, see Section 16, Chapter 3, this study.

a. The principal types of intelligence furnished by the Intelligence Staff, Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Force, were as follows: operational intelligence (matters pertaining to attacks and sighting of enemy ships, enemy surface force dispositions, enemy submarine movements, and enemy mining), intelligence derived from captured enemy documents and equipment, intelligence produced by interrogating prisoners of war, and from photographic reconnaissance.

b. The transmission of this intelligence was by any one, or a combination of, the following three methods:

- (1) Through the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Force.
- (2) Through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, by means of the Naval Intelligence Sub-Division, G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- (3) Through the Joint Intelligence Committee, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, of which the Chief of the Intelligence Staff, Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Forces, was a member.

12. The Intelligence Staff, Commander of the Navy in Europe also furnished intelligence to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. It consisted primarily of special naval intelligence studies, or data obtained from the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, in Washington. The intelligence was transmitted to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, through the Intelligence Staff, Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Force, or on occasion, directly from the Intelligence Staff of the Commander of the Navy in Europe to the G-2 Division of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.³

SECTION 5

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE ARMY GROUPS

13. The G-2 Divisions of the Army Groups were intelligence staffs of commanders subordinate to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. These intelligence staffs were the primary sources of intelligence derived from tactical operations in the European Theater.

14. The intelligence divisions of the Army Groups gathered, produced and transmitted intelligence which was derived from:

- a. Combat intelligence reports from combat units.
- b. Office of Strategic Services' reports.
- c. Signal intercept reports.
- d. Interrogation of prisoners of war.
- e. Interrogation of friendly and enemy civilians.
- f. The examination of captured documents.
- g. Tactical reconnaissance reports and photographs.
- h. Fighter-bomber reports.

15. Transmission of reports. The transmission of intelligence obtained at Army Group level to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, was through the normal command and staff channels.

SECTION 6

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

16. Relation of Office of Strategic Services to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. The Office of Strategic Services, as authorized by the President of the United States on 13 June 1942, came under the jurisdiction of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.¹⁰ Initially, the Office of Strategic Services in the European Theater of Operations operated under the direction and control of the Theater Commander.¹¹ When Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, came into existence, it became necessary for the Office of Strategic Services to establish relations with that headquarters. This relationship was established and maintained through a liaison office at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, by the Office of Strategic Services.¹² As originally intended, the Office of Strategic Services was to give its full support to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force; that is, it was to carry out special requests made by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and to keep Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, informed of its activities and the intelligence it produced.^{14,15} Because of this relation established with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, was no longer concerned with the Operations of the Office of Strategic Services, but they were responsible for the billeting, office facilities, and supply of the Office of Strategic Services in the European Theater.^{14,15} Therefore, the Office of Strategic Services in the European Theater had a dual responsibility of supporting the operations of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and also operating under the direct control of its headquarters in Washington. The Office of Strategic Services worked very closely with the

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, on planning and with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, on the actual conduct of missions.¹³ However, this relationship with G-2 was not entirely satisfactory from the intelligence point of view because the Office of Strategic Services participated in many activities in the European Theater of which the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, knew nothing.³

17. Organization into Branches.

a. The Office of Strategic Services had six different operational branches in the European Theater of Operations, United States Army. These six branches were:¹²

- (1) Special Operations (SO) Branch.
- (2) Secret Intelligence (SI) Branch.
- (3) Counter Intelligence (X2 or CIB) Branch.
- (4) Psychological Warfare (MO) Branch.
- (5) Research and Analysis (R and A) Branch.
- (6) Field Photographic Branch.

b. Of the six branches mentioned above, the Psychological Warfare Branch was the only branch that did not produce intelligence. This branch disseminated propaganda to the Germans by radio broadcasts (supposedly emanating from German radio stations), through pamphlets dropped by airplane, and by loud speaker broadcasts.

18. Types of intelligence. From the six branches mentioned in paragraph 17 a above, four types of intelligence were produced and transmitted to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force:¹²

a. Positive intelligence. Positive intelligence came from agents who were dropped with wireless/telegraph sets behind the enemy lines. These agents sent in reports, such as: the composition, location and movements of enemy units, the nature of enemy defenses, the location of enemy war factories, and terrain information. Positive intelligence came mainly from the Secret Intelligence Branch. However, some came from the Special Operations Branch and from liaison with other secret Allied intelligence services.

b. Counter-intelligence. This type of information, obtained from the Counter Intelligence Branch, dealt with German intelligence agencies, the Abwehr (Army), and the Sicherheitsdienst (German Party). This information was obtained by agents operating behind the enemy lines and by interrogation of enemy agents who had been captured by Allied forces.

c. Intelligence from research and analysis. The Research and Analysis Branch studied, collated, analyzed, and interpreted intelligence produced by other agencies. The resulting data were disseminated to interested sections in Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

d. Photographic intelligence. The Office of Strategic Services included facilities for taking, developing, and interpreting

photographs. The results of this work were of tremendous value to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, particularly in the study of damage inflicted by strategic bombing.

19. Transmission of intelligence to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. The Office of Strategic Services established direct liaison with the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Intelligence produced by the Office of Strategic Services was sent to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, through the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and through the Office of Strategic Services liaison office established in Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. The Office of Strategic Services also attached field detachments to army groups and armies operating in the field. These field detachments collected information pertinent to intelligence and counter intelligence and transmitted this information direct to Office of Strategic Services in London, and to the army, or army group with which they worked. Office of Strategic Services in London, the army groups, or the armies, in turn transmitted this information to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.¹²

SECTION 7

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH AGENCIES

20. Intelligence services of American and British agencies. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, received intelligence from American and British agencies in the United States and London. The principal agencies were:

a. United States agencies.

- (1) G-2 Division, War Department, General Staff.
- (2) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
- (3) A-2 Division, Army Air Forces.
- (4) State Department.
- (5) Joint Intelligence Committee.
- (6) Embassies and Attaches.

b. British agencies.¹

- (1) Director Military Intelligence, War Office.
- (2) Assistant Chief Air Staff, Intelligence, Air Ministry.
- (3) Director Naval Intelligence, Admiralty.
- (4) Combined Operations Headquarters.
- (5) Joint Intelligence Committee, London.
- (6) Military Intelligence Research Service.
- (7) Inter-Service Topographical Department.

- (8) Ministry of Economic Warfare.
- (9) Political Warfare Executive.
- (10) British Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring Service.
- (11) Foreign Office Research Department.

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Lt Col William G. Suhling
Mr. Randolph H. Beardsley
Mr. Allen W. Dulles
14. Statements made by Colonel Franklin O. Canfield, 090928, GSC, OSS representative to SHAFF, in personal interview.
15. Statements made by Maj Earle J. Carleton, 01169888, FA, Operations and Plans, OSS, ETO, in personal interview.

CHAPTER 2

DEVELOPMENT OF THE G-2 DIVISION, SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED

EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

SECTION 8

MAJOR FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE G-2 DIVISION,

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

21. The Intelligence Branch, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command, which subsequently developed into the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was organized on 12 April 1943.¹ This branch was conceived as a small advisory intelligence staff with the mission of controlling intelligence policies and coordinating intelligence activities in the European Theater of Operations and of presenting the broad intelligence picture to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force during the planning phase of the invasion of France.¹ As initially conceived, the Intelligence Branch, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command, contained no direct or independent sources of information; rather, all intelligence was supplied by London, Washington, and subordinate commands in the field.^{1,3,4} This data included the information necessary to assist the operational staffs of the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command, in preparing their appreciations and outline schemes for the invasion of France.²

22. The integration of British and American personnel in the Intelligence Branch, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command, was a predominant factor in the development of this branch and in the later organization of G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.^{1,2} Although all three services of Great Britain and the United States were represented in the Intelligence Branch, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command, the meager facilities provided by American intelligence agencies initially dictated almost complete dependance on the more experienced British intelligence staffs. This dependance on British intelligence agencies for information and intelligence was particularly necessary during the planning stage for the operations involving the invasion of France.^{1,5} After the invasion of France, however, the main sources of information were from forces in the field. From that point on, the Americans capably furnished their rightful share of intelligence.

23. British leadership on the intelligence staffs of both Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command, and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was provided in the appointment of Major General P. S. Whitefoord (Br) on 18 April 1943 as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command.¹ Major General J. F. M. Whitely (Br) relieved General Whitefoord on 29 January 1944,⁶ and was in turn relieved by Major General K. W. D. Strong (Br) on 25 May 1944.⁶ General Strong continued in this capacity until the final day of the European War, 8 May 1945.

SECTION 9

INITIAL ORGANIZATION OF G-2 DIVISION, SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

24. Initial organization. On 12 February 1944, the Intelligence

Branch, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command, became the G-2 (Intelligence) Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (See Chart 2). The initial spheres of responsibility and functions of the intelligence staff for the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, were covered in a directive issued 10 February 1944 by the combined Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower.⁷ Essentially, these responsibilities and functions, as initially conceived and formulated, were as follows:^{7,8}

a. The G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was to contain British and American Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives.

b. In the field, G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was to furnish the Supreme Allied Commander such intelligence as he required. It was to conduct no intelligence operation, technical or tactical, apart from the more detailed air operational intelligence required to enable the Air Commander-in-Chief to control his Air Forces. Its primary sources of information were to be the subordinate commands in the field and appropriate agencies in Washington and London (War and Navy Departments, United States Army Air Forces, Office of Strategic Services, War Ministry, Admiralty, etc).

c. The G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was to control intelligence policies and co-ordinate intelligence activities of all forces and agencies allocated to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

d. There was to be a mutual exchange between the British and American intelligence agencies and the intelligence staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, of any intelligence report affecting the Allied Expeditionary Force, or its operations. The originator of any such intelligence report was to have the responsibility of disseminating its contents to other intelligence staffs concerned.

e. In principle, the direct flow of information and intelligence between subordinate elements of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and the American and British intelligence agencies was authorized but was to be co-ordinated by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

f. Close liaison between army groups and Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Force with the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, on intelligence matters was to be achieved by the use of special liaison officers.

g. The G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was to be responsible for the co-ordination of all signal intelligence policies in army groups and for giving advice on signal and cipher security, radio counter-measures, and wireless deception.²

h. The G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was to be responsible for the establishment of counter-intelligence and censorship policy and for the co-ordination of these policies between army groups. It was to be, in addition, responsible for the co-ordination, collection, collation, and dissemination of counter-intelligence information within Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

i. The G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expedition-

ary Force, was to co-ordinate the measures necessary in army groups to counter the activities of hostile elements in the civil population, for counter-espionage and counter-sabotage and for security measures with regard to refugees. In all these matters, close liaison was to be maintained with Civil Affairs Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

j. The G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was to establish policies and co-ordinate the execution of censorship in the field, in occupied countries, and in Germany, and to advise on censorship of press and propaganda in close liaison with the Propaganda and Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

25. Limitation of functions. The organization of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was intended to ensure that functions which could be carried out more efficiently by service ministries and agencies at home or by subordinate commands in the field were not undertaken by the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, which was designed as a small staff dealing with intelligence policy in the field and with strategical intelligence.⁸

SECTION 10

FINAL ORGANIZATION G-2 DIVISION, SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. (8 MAY 1945)

26. Progressive major changes in original organization. The development of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, from the date of its activation on 12 February 1944 to 8 May 1945 was characterized by its growth into a large operational staff section. The principal factors which created the change of the initial organization were as follows:

- a. The decision that the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, must be more than a small advisory staff dealing with matters of high policy and high level planning.
- b. The need for control and co-ordination of intelligence activities in the occupation of liberated and conquered territories.¹
- c. The need for co-ordination and control of the various operational agencies which came under direct control of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.^{1,14,15,16,17}
- d. The addition of the Censorship Sub-Division, and the Naval Intelligence Sub-Division.^{18,19}

27. Change in the conception of the G-2 Division from a small intelligence staff with no independent or direct sources of intelligence into an intelligence staff capable of issuing and supervising the execution of orders occurred immediately after the activation of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.^{9,10} The experiences of Major General J. F. M. Whitely, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and of certain other officers on his staff who had served in the Allied Force Headquarters, in the Mediterranean Theater, dictated that certain intelligence operating agencies must be provided within the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, for the planning of the invasion of Con-

tinental Europe and for subsequent operations after that invasion.^{1,10} The incorporation of the Theater Intelligence Section and the Theater Documents Section into the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was the first such change made in the original concept of the functions and responsibilities of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. During the tenure of Major General J. F. M. Whitely, and subsequently of Major General K. W. D. Strong, as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, this division gradually evolved into a large intelligence staff with its own operational intelligence agencies providing direct and independent sources of information in addition to that provided by subordinate commands, by London, and by Washington.¹

a. The Theater Intelligence Section^{11,12} provided detailed research intelligence during the planning stage of the operation for the invasion of Europe for the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force; the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Force; the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force; and the commanders of the army groups for that area of France and the low countries in which the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, was preparing operations. Prior to 12 November 1943, the Theater Intelligence Section had been a British intelligence agency concerned with the detailed study of intelligence concerning Western Europe. On this date, however, the section was established as a separate intelligence agency under the control of the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command. On 12 February 1944, the section was incorporated into the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. The functions of the Theater Intelligence Section were gradually absorbed by the Operational Intelligence Sub-Division of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and on 22 May 1944, the Theater Intelligence Section was finally dissolved. Prior to its absorption by the Operational Intelligence Sub-Division, the Theater Intelligence Section was responsible for intelligence on the following subjects:⁸

- (1) Enemy order of battle.
- (2) Enemy land defenses.
- (3) Beaches, inundations, roads, rivers and airfields.
- (4) Terrain and topography.
- (5) Enemy lines of communication including military roads, military control of railways, troops and supply movements, rates of reinforcements, motor transport concentrations, fuel supply and dumps in conjunction with the Air War Office.
- (6) Signal installations, in relation to defense systems, and order of battle in conjunction with Military Intelligence War Office.
- (7) Military supplies and supply installations.
- (8) Local resources, electric power, and water supply.
- (9) Civil administration, organization and control in occupied countries, insofar as it would affect the work of the intelligence staffs of army groups.
- (10) German Air Force intelligence, limited to the follow-

ing: German Air Force--intelligence concerning strength and location of ground personnel which might affect ground operations. Flak--intelligence concerning flak and airfield defenses which might be used in a ground role.

b. The Theater Documents Section¹ was originated in the initial organization of G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and was charged with the detailed examination and exploitation of all enemy documents. This agency provided intelligence direct to the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

28. The control and co-ordination necessary for the occupation of liberated and conquered territories also resulted in reorganization of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

a. The Allied Occupational Commitments Co-ordination Sub-Committee¹ was formed as the intelligence agency for the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, to co-ordinate the intelligence planning for the occupational period in Germany. It co-ordinated occupational intelligence planning in the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, with other staff agencies in Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and with other Allied governmental agencies. On 17 February 1945, the Allied Occupational Commitments Co-ordination Sub-Committee was transferred to operational control of the Special Sections Sub-Division.

29. The reorganization necessary to co-ordinate and control the various operational agencies which came under control of G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, brought several changes in the organization of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.^{1,13} These changes occurred primarily in the field of technical intelligence. Initially, the activities involving technical intelligence played a minor role in intelligence operations, but the experiences of Allied forces in Italy brought to light the need for agencies to examine and exploit the vast amount of enemy equipment and material, as well as enemy technical personnel, captured during combat operations in that country. Consequently, in the European Theater, the British and United States air, ground, and naval forces dispatched field investigative teams to examine and exploit these intelligence targets. In addition, the United States and Great Britain governmental departments or ministries dispatched investigative teams to cover intelligence targets of interest to their respective departments or ministries. The initial organization of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, did not provide for any staff agency to control and co-ordinate the activities of the various agencies investigating intelligence targets in the European Theater. Upon the entry of Allied forces into Germany, however, it became necessary to control and co-ordinate the operations of the various teams investigating the vast amount of intelligence targets uncovered by the advance of the Allied forces. Hence, to control and co-ordinate the operation of these investigative teams with respect to the combat operations of the Allied forces, the following staff agencies were created within the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force:

a. The "T" Sub-Division¹⁴ was formed in July, 1944, in the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, as the agency responsible to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, for all matters within his juris-

diction concerning the investigation and exploitation of intelligence objectives or targets. On 17 February 1945, this sub-division was transferred to the Special Sections Sub-Division when the latter was organized.

b. The Special Sections Sub-Division¹⁷ was organized on 17 February 1945. It combined the functions and activities initiated during the preceding months by the Allied Occupational Commitments Coordination Sub-Division with those activities directed by the Intelligence Target (T) Sub-Division.

30. Other changes from the original organization G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

a. The censorship activities of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, were initially included in the general activities of the Counter Intelligence Sub-Division. However, during February, 1944, in a major policy change in which civil censorship was withdrawn as an operational function and responsibility of army groups and placed under control of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, all censorship activities were separated from the Counter Intelligence Sub-Division and formed into the Censorship Sub-Division.^{1,18}

b. The Naval Intelligence Sub-Division¹⁹ was organized in April, 1944, to co-ordinate and exchange information on all naval intelligence matters with all other Sub-Divisions of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

31. The organization of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force on 8 May 1945, the final day of the war in Europe, is as shown on Chart No. 3.

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4. Ltr, JIC (43) 217, 20 May 43. CALA Documents File, USFET.
5. Ltr, 10 Feb 44, Lt Col La'trobe Bateman (Br) to Maj Gen J. F. M. Whitely, AC of S, G-2, SHAEF, Inclosure "History of TIS". CALA Documents File, USFET.
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18. "Origin and Development G-2 Division, SHAEF", (Section on

Censorship) see 1 and 13 above.

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CHAPTER 3

FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE TYPE OF INTELLIGENCE

DEVELOPED BY THE G-2 DIVISION, SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE*

SECTION 11

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUB-DIVISION

32. The Operational Intelligence Sub-Division^{1,9} was engaged in the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence of immediate tactical value as well as that of long range strategic importance. The Sub-Division was organized into the following sections and sub-sections:

- a. Enemy forces Section.
 - (1) German Army Sub-Section.
 - (2) Summaries Sub-Section.
 - (3) "Fatherland" Sub-Section.
- b. Research Section.
 - (1) Engineer and Topographical Sub-Section.
 - (2) Operational Intelligence Library.
 - (3) Defense Sub-Section.
- c. Enemy Plans and Logistics Section.
 - (1) Plans and Logistics Sub-Section.
 - (2) Enemy Supply Installations Sub-Section.
 - (3) Enemy Communications Sub-Section.
- d. Air Reconnaissance Coordination Section.
 - (1) Army Photographic Interpretation Sub-Section.
- e. Prisoner of War and Refugee Section.
- f. Economics Section.
- g. Enemy Documents Section.
- h. Technical Intelligence Section.

* The organization of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, presented in this chapter is the organization as it existed on 8 May 1945, the final day of the war in Europe.

1. Circulation Section.

The functions of these sections and sub-sections will be briefly described in the following paragraphs.

33. The Enemy Forces Section^{1,9} consisted of three sub-sections which operated as follows:

a. The German Army Sub-Section prepared and maintained studies on dispositions of enemy forces, enemy organization, and tactical and strategic reserves. This sub-section coordinated its activities with the Enemy Plans and Logistics Sub-Section.

b. The Summaries Sub-Section edited and published the Weekly Intelligence Summary of G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. This publication summarized the intelligence picture for the preceding week on the Western Front and provided a general summary of weekly intelligence activities in other theaters of war.

c. The "Fatherland" Sub-Section edited and published "Fatherland", a weekly publication which provided general intelligence on Germany, such as: the German Army organization, administration, and supply; the state of communications within Germany; and information on German industry, economics, and topography.

34. The Research Section^{1,9} was divided into three sub-sections which functioned as shown below:

a. The Engineer and Topographical Sub-Section was primarily concerned with the production of engineer intelligence. The subjects dealt with by this sub-section were essentially the following: terrain studies; communications, town reports, beaches, and airfields. A detachment from the Engineer and Topographical Sub-Section worked with the Ministry of Economic Warfare (Br) and furnished information on the following subjects: water supply, local resources available to engineers in the field, defenses, public health, and operational targets. The Engineer and Topographical Sub-Section worked in close cooperation with the Air Reconnaissance Coordination Section. Liaison was maintained chiefly with the following agencies:

- (1) General Staff Intelligence (Royal Engineers), 21 Army Group.
- (2) Information Section, Intelligence Division, Headquarters of Communications Zone (Main); Office of Engineers, European Theater of Operations, United States Army.
- (3) Inter-Allied Service Topographical Department.*
- (4) Ministry of Economic Warfare.
- (5) Chief of Engineers, War Department.

* A joint British-American topographical service organized in London to provide photo interpretation studies for the invasion of France and subsequent operations on the Continent.

(6) MI 10, War Office (intelligence on German communications).

b. The Operational Intelligence Library^{1,9} was the agency responsible for the collection, maintenance, and distribution of intelligence literature pertaining to the Operational Intelligence Sub-Division.

c. The Defense Sub-Section was responsible for information on static enemy defenses. It gathered this information from agents, photographic reconnaissance, interrogation of prisoners of war, and documents. The sub-section kept this information on file and published it when necessary for the benefit of subordinate units. The Defense Sub-Section maintained close liaison with the Army Photographic Intelligence Service Sub-Section; the Naval Intelligence Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force; and the Inter-Allied Service Topographical Service.

35. The Enemy Plans and Logistics Section^{1,9} functioned through the following sub-sections:

a. The Plans and Logistics Sub-section^{1,9} studied the best use of strategic bombing as seen from the point of view of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. It maintained intelligence data on new trends in the enemy's supply system and on his use of roads, railroads, and waterways. This sub-section worked in close liaison with the Air Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, with the Combined Service Strategic Targets Committee* (London), and with the planning agencies in G-3 and G-4 Divisions, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

b. The Enemy Supply Installations Sub-Section^{1,9} prepared basic target material for the tactical and strategic Air Forces. It recorded and published a full description of all enemy dumps and supply installations, maintaining contact in this connection with the War Office Intelligence Branches and with the Allied Central Interpretation Unit** at Medmenham. This sub-section also kept an accurate record of enemy barracks and camps, maintaining liaison with G-1 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, on the location of camps containing Allied prisoners of war.

c. The Enemy Communications Sub-Section^{1,9} working in close cooperation with the Air Reconnaissance Coordination section, kept abreast of the following intelligence subjects:

- (1) Personnel and administration of enemy communication system.
- (2) Routes of troop movements, and enemy use of main highways, bridges, ferries, etc.
- (3) Condition of enemy rail communication system and the effects of air attack on such enemy equipment as locomotives, rolling stock, railway stations, and rail lines.

* See Section 3, Chapter 1.

** An Air Ministry organization of British and American personnel which handled interpretation of aerial photographs.

(4) Enemy plans for demolitions and mines.

The principal sources of this intelligence were aerial photographs, interrogation reports, and captured documents.

36. The Air Reconnaissance Coordination Section^{1,9} was charged with the coordination of all demands for aerial reconnaissance from the various staff divisions of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and from subordinate units under the operational control of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. The section contained the following sub-section which functioned as indicated:

a. The Army Photographic Interpretation Sub-Section furnished photo intelligence to, and provided a photographic library for, all staff agencies of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and its subordinate commands. This intelligence covered such diversified subjects as coastal defenses, inland defense lines, depots, dumps, and railway movements. The sub-section normally worked with the:

- (1) Engineer Topographical Section, G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- (2) Intelligence Section, Royal Air Force.
- (3) Air Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

37. The Prisoner of War and Refugee Sub-Section^{1,9} was charged with the responsibility of obtaining information from prisoners of war and refugees for the various staff agencies in Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. This sub-section briefed the various interrogating agencies in the European Theater of Operations with the requirements of the information desired by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. The main sources of intelligence for this section were:

MI 19, War Office (Br).
 Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center (Br).
 Intelligence staffs of major air force commands of Britain and the United States.
 Prisoner of War Interrogation Section (Br).
 Royal Patriotic Schools (British Refugee Section).
 Interrogation reports of subordinate Allied armies.
 6824 Detailed Interrogation Center (US).
 Mobile Interrogation Units (US).
 Naval Intelligence Department (US).

Close liaison was maintained with the War Office and War Department intelligence agencies, and the G-1 and G-2 Divisions, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army.

38. The Economic Section^{1,9} was the advising agency within the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, on all matters pertinent to the economic situation of the enemy and thus supplied the economic intelligence needed during operations by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and by the subordinate army groups. Economic intelligence teams were attached to army groups for the purpose of collecting economic intelligence and for aiding the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, of army groups, in matters pertaining to economic intelligence. The Economic Section maintained close contact with the Enemy Plans and Logistics Section, and with the Technical Intelligence

Section of the Operational Intelligence Sub-Division. The Economic Section received much of its information from the Economic Advisory Branch (London), and the Economic Warfare Division (London).

39. The Enemy Documents Section^{1.9} was charged with the collection and exploitation of enemy documents. The section maintained personnel whose specialized training enabled them to produce precise and detailed intelligence from enemy documents. The section also operated two document centers, one in Paris and one in Brussels, which not only provided central repositories for enemy documents but also assisted and coordinated the numerous Allied agencies interested in exploiting captured enemy documents. Through its document teams, the Documents Section kept close liaison with similar sections of armies, army groups, and the Communications Zone.

40. The Technical Intelligence Section^{1.9} acted as a clearing house for all technical information obtained from the field, and controlled the allocation of all captured enemy war materials wanted for technical intelligence purposes. It cleared requests for information from the War Department, War Office, British Ministries, and American governmental departments. The Technical Intelligence Section also produced publications on enemy materiel, maintained a technical intelligence reference library, and handled documents pertinent to technical intelligence. The Section maintained liaison with the following agencies outside of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force:

- Technical Intelligence Field Team.
- Army and Army Group Headquarters.
- Air Technical Intelligence Agencies.
- Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Force.
- United States Strategic Air Forces.
- Communications Zone.
- Allied Field Headquarters (Mediterranean Theater of Operations).
- Commander, Naval Forces in Europe (US).
- United States Embassy, London.
- War Department.
- War Office.
- Army Service Forces.
- French War Department.
- Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee.

41. The Circulation Section¹ disseminated all incoming intelligence material to sections within the Operational Intelligence Sub-Division and, when instructed, to other branches of the G-2 Division and other staff divisions, of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

SECTION 12

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SUB-DIVISION

42. The Counter Intelligence Sub-Division^{1.2} was the intelligence agency responsible to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, for all matters of a counter-intelligence nature arising within the limits of the responsibilities of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. These duties included the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information relating to enemy intelligence agencies; the safeguarding of Allied military information; and the supervision of all matters pertaining to counter-espionage, counter-sabotage, and counter-subversion. The sub-division also coordinated all counter-intelligence activities within the theater,

including the activities of the security branches of liberated governments. In addition, the sub-division generally supervised, as to the counter-intelligence element, all plans made by the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. The Counter Intelligence Sub-Division was organized into five sections, two of which, the Civil Security Section and the Military Security Section, were divided into sub-sections.

43. The Military Security Section^{1,2} was responsible for the formulation and coordination of policy, and for supervision of execution of all matters affecting military security in Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and in its subordinate commands. In addition, the section maintained liaison with sabotage experts and published anti-sabotage instructions to the subordinate commands. Close cooperation was maintained with both censorship and public relations staff agencies in Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Any matter or question involving security in either of these staff agencies was promptly submitted to the Military Security Section for a decision or for advice. In addition to its operational duties, the section also compiled the data for the weekly counter-intelligence summary published by the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

a. The Field Security/Counter Intelligence Corps Sub-section, composed of personnel from both the Field Security Police (Br) and the Counter Intelligence Corps (US), was responsible for all counter-intelligence phases of the security of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. While the section was not responsible for the local security of the headquarters, it was responsible for conducting security surveys and for the general surveillance of the immediate locality of the headquarters in order to protect the safety of the staff and of important visitors. In this work, close cooperation was maintained with the Security Command of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Additional duties of the section included the screening of personnel assigned to or employed in Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the investigation of violations of regulations pertaining to the security of military information within this headquarters.

44. The Plans and Operations Section^{1,2} generally supervised the counter-intelligence aspects of plans and coordinated all planning activities of other sections of the Counter Intelligence Sub-Division. It was also responsible for the study of the counter-intelligence phase of plans prepared by other staff agencies and staff divisions of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

45. The Port, Frontier, and Travel Security Section^{1,2} was responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies pertaining to travel security. Particular attention was paid to ports, airports, and frontiers. These policies were used by field units in making decisions on individual travel applications and on cases of irregular travel. Additional important functions of the section were the planning of port, frontier, and travel policies for Germany during the Allied occupational period and the determination of a policy controlling the movement of civilians into and out of Germany. These duties required close cooperation with the Combined Visitors Bureau of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and with travel permit issuing agencies in the United States, United Kingdom, France, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

46. The Civil Security Section^{1,2} was concerned with all security problems arising outside military units and not pertaining to safeguarding of military information or involving the crossing of an international boundary. It supervised the plans for the counter-intelligence organi-

zation in Germany after hostilities, including the counter-intelligence aspects of control and disposal of the German Armed Forces, the Nazi Party and its subsidiaries, and of resistance organizations. In this connection, liaison was maintained with Allied and liberated governments, as well as governments-in-exile. The counter-intelligence work of these governments was controlled by incorporating their counter intelligence agencies within the framework of British and United States counter intelligence organization. The section was also responsible for the security controls placed upon civilian populations, and for the determination of policy concerning the arrest, detention, interrogation, and trial of enemy agents and suspects.

a. The Special Counter Intelligence Sub-section^{1,2} was responsible for the collection and evaluation of counter intelligence data from its special sources and the penetration of enemy intelligence services by means of special counter-espionage. The sub-section maintained close liaison with counter-espionage authorities in liberated countries and maintained direct communication with the War Office. In addition, it furnished and interpreted for the Counter Intelligence Sub-Division all counter-espionage information received from the various available sources, and assisted in the selection and evaluation of counter-espionage targets whose capture was likely to yield material of value. It also assisted in the examination of captured documents and in the interrogation of captured enemy agents. The sub-section comprised personnel from British secret intelligence and the Office of the Strategic Services. Liaison was maintained with the counter intelligence staffs in the headquarters of army groups.

b. The Evaluation and Dissemination Sub-Section was responsible for the evaluation, collation, and dissemination of counter-intelligence information. It prepared and issued counter-intelligence publications of general interest. It also prepared personality cards containing information on enemy agents and suspects, for the use of counter intelligence personnel in the field and for the compilation of counter-intelligence target material.

c. The MI 5 Liaison Sub-Section was responsible for the investigation, arrest, detention, and disposal of British traitors and suspect traitors in the European Theater of Operations.

d. The Federal Bureau of Investigation Liaison Sub-section was responsible for the investigation, arrest, detention, and disposal of American traitors and suspect traitors in the European Theater of Operations.

e. The British Indian Security Sub-Section coordinated the handling of suspect traitorous British Indian Prisoners of War and civilians in the European Theater of Operations.

f. The Counter Intelligence War Room collected, collated, evaluated, and disseminated information concerning the German intelligence services. This included dissemination of urgent information to the subordinate field forces through special communications.

47. The Executive Section^{1,2} was responsible for the administration of personnel; supply; and assignment, supervision, coordination, and review of work of the various other sections of the Counter Intelligence Sub-Division.

SECTION 13

SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SUB-DIVISION

48. The functions of the Signal Intelligence Sub-Division^{1,2} were to ensure the maximum coordinated effort from United States and British signal intelligence organizations available to support the ground forces under the command of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and in collaboration with the Counter Intelligence Sub-Division, to advise the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, on signal security problems affecting Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and its subordinate units. This sub-division was a small signal intelligence agency, consisting of only one subordinate section, the Telecommunications Intelligence Section.

a. The Telecommunications Intelligence Section functions were:

- (1) To cooperate with the British and United States army groups in the collection of enemy telecommunication information, and to coordinate the transmission of this information to the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- (2) To provide Signal Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, with telecommunications intelligence derived from the collation and evaluation of information received from the army groups and from the various British and United States intelligence agencies.
- (3) To coordinate and maintain liaison with the British War Office on matters of telecommunication intelligence.
- (4) To maintain a library of all available information on German telecommunication policy, procedure, organization, technical installations, and equipment.

The Signal Intelligence Sub-Division dealt directly with the General Staff Intelligence, 21 Army Group, on all signal intelligence matters affecting the British. It dealt with the signal intelligence agencies of the United States army groups on questions concerning United States signal problems. Questions affecting the technical direction of the United States signal intelligence units were handled through the Signal Intelligence Detachment, European Theater of Operations, United States Army. This sub-division dealt directly with the War Office on British signal intelligence policy and organization; and also worked directly with the War Office on certain problems affecting the security of signal intelligence.

SECTION 14

CENSORSHIP SUB-DIVISION

49. The Censorship Sub-Division^{1,2} was the policy-making staff agency of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, which provided staff direction and coordination for the censorship of communications of all forces under the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. Under the authority vested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the operation of the censorship of civilian communications in Europe was also a responsibility of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. This Sub-Division acted as the staff agency of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to control the policy and coordinate the operation of civil censorship in liberated and conquered countries.⁴

50. The Postal and Travelers' Section^{1,2} was responsible for dealing with all matters relating to the censorship of communications other

than those transmitted by electrical means both in Germany and in the liberated countries. It made recommendations as to the action necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an effective civil censorship in Germany, as well as recommending the action necessary to ensure that the censorship requirements of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, were met in the liberated countries. It kept a current comprehensive detailed statement of the communications, other than those transmitted by electrical means, authorized and actually flowing to, from, and within Northwest Europe, together with information as to the points at which censorship was exercised and the extent to which censorship was imposed. Close liaison was maintained with the Postal and Traveler's Censorship component of army group staffs in order to coordinate their activities and to provide assistance to them in the accomplishment of their mission.

51. The Tele-communications Section^{1,2} conducted all activities necessary to discharge the responsibilities of the Censorship Sub-Division as related to the censorship of electrical communications subject to civil censorship. In accomplishing this, the Tele-communications Section was responsible for dealing with all matters relating to the censorship of electrical communications in both Germany and liberated countries. It recommended action necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an effective civil censorship in Germany, and to ensure that the civil censorship requirements of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, were met in the liberated countries. Close liaison was maintained with the Tele-communications Censorship component of army group staffs in order to coordinate their activities and provide assistance to them in the accomplishment of their mission. The section maintained a current, comprehensive, detailed statement of the tele-communications authorized and actually flowing to, from, and within Northwest Europe, together with information as to the points at which censorship was exercised and the extent to which censorship was imposed.

52. The Information and Records Section^{1,2} served as the central clearing agency for all information derived from censorship established by liberated governments and for information of interest derived from censorship agencies in the British Empire and the United States. This section served as the focal point for the distribution of information to the forementioned censorship agencies and to the staff divisions of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. The latter function involved continuous liaison with all these censorship agencies and staff agencies in order to ensure that they received all the information required by them, and that information no longer of interest to them was not reported from censored communications.

53. The Allied Censorship Section^{1,2,3,4} was responsible that the civil censorship requirements of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, were met in the several liberated countries. As indicated in Chapter 2, Section 10, paragraph 30, the responsibility for the operation of civil censorship was withdrawn in February 1944, from army groups and became the responsibility of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. However, on 9 January 1945, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, directed that the establishment and operation of civil censorship in Germany become the responsibility of army groups. This change was directed because it was believed that the army groups had been relieved of this large responsibility of civil censorship during the crucial period of the heavy planning and operational phase of the invasion of France and the combat operations immediately thereafter. Civil censorship in liberated countries still remained a responsibility of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. Actually, no civil communications were reopened in Germany until after the end of the war;

therefore, the responsibility for civil censorship in Germany involved only the planning for the ultimate civil censorship to be established in that country.

a. An Allied Censorship Group was established in each of the liberated countries; the number of personnel in each of the groups depended upon the magnitude of the job to be done and ranged from one officer in Luxembourg to 15 officers and 11 enlisted men in France. These Allied Censorship Groups acted as the link between the censorship staff at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the censorship organizations in the several liberated countries. Initially, during the period when the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, exercised jurisdiction over liberated countries, the Allied Censorship Groups acted as control officers. Subsequently, when jurisdiction over liberated countries was returned to the respective governments concerned, officers assigned to the Allied Censorship Groups became liaison officers. The Allied Censorship Section was the channel through which the liberated governments' requests for reopening of communications was processed. This channel was established in order to ensure that all agencies in the field were coordinated. Continuous contact was maintained with the censorship and security staffs of army groups and the Communications Zone, United States Army. Concurrence was always obtained from these censorship and security staffs prior to submitting to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, any request for the reopening of communications. In view of the fact that the Allied Censorship Groups were the primary contact with the censorship authorities of the Allied Governments, the ability to establish and maintain cordial close working arrangements with those authorities was one of the greatest single factors in the successful creation of the Allied censorship network in Northwest Europe.

54. The Liaison Section^{1,2} was composed of those officers of other agencies accredited to G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, for censorship liaison purposes. This section contained representatives of the United States Office of Censorship, the Admiralty, the British Post and Telegraph Censorship, and the Air Ministry. Effective coordination was also maintained with the world wide censorship network including the British Empire, the United States, Italy, the Mediterranean areas, and the Pacific area.

55. The Military Censorship Section^{1,2} undertook all activities necessary to discharge the responsibilities of the Counter Intelligence Sub-Division as related to military censorship. This section recommended action necessary to ensure that the censorship requirements of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, were met with respect to communications to and from prisoners of war and internees held by forces under the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. It maintained liaison with:

a. The Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Force in connection with the censorship of communications of United States and British Navies.

b. The Air Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, in connection with the censorship of communications of the Royal Air Force.

c. The Headquarters, Communications Zone, United States Army, in connection with the base censorship of communications of all United States Army personnel, including Air Force personnel.

d. The 12 Army Group, 6 Army Group, and United States Stra-

tegric Air Forces in connection with the censorship of communications from United States Army personnel.

e. The 21 Army Group concerning the censorship of communications of British and Canadian Forces.

56. The Secretariat and Clerical Section^{1,2} prepared and issued agenda, papers, and minutes, of all formal conferences held by the Sub-Division with other agencies, and was responsible for all administrative duties necessary to provide for the smooth functioning of this sub-division.

SECTION 15

SPECIAL SECTIONS SUB-DIVISION

57. The Special Sections Sub-Division^{1,2,8} comprising the following seven staff agencies was organized on 17 February 1945 to combine the functions initiated by the Intelligence Target (T) Sub-Division* and the Allied Occupational Commitments Coordination Sub-Division:**

Occupational Intelligence Training Section.
Intelligence Targets "T" Sub-Division.
Naval Targets Sub-Division.
Air Targets Sub-Division.
Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section.
Scientific Intelligence Advisory Section.
Japanese Intelligence Section.

All matters of intelligence pertinent to the occupation of liberated or conquered countries which were not the exclusive interest of any other staff agency of the G-2 Division were handled by the Special Sections Sub-Division. The sub-division, however, was principally concerned with the coordination, supervision, and facilitation of the investigation of intelligence targets in Germany by authorized Allied agencies. In the latter function, the sub-division served as the executive agency in Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, for the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee.

a. The Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee⁵ was formed on 21 August 1944 by the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to insure that the valuable intelligence which was derived from captured enemy material, equipment, and personnel both in enemy occupied, and enemy territory would be available not only to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, but also to the various interested British and United States governmental departments. The sub-committee was responsible directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and had the following representation:

United Kingdom

- (1) The Foreign Office.
- (2) The Director of Naval Intelligence.
- (3) The Director of Military Intelligence.

* See Chapter 2, Section 10, Paragraph 29.

** See Chapter 2, Section 10, Paragraph 28.

- (4) The Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence.
- (5) The Ministry of Economic Warfare.
- (6) The Ministry of Supply.
- (7) The Ministry of Aircraft Production.

United States.

- (1) The Department of State.
- (2) The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.
- (3) The Director of Naval Intelligence.
- (4) The Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Army Air Force.
- (5) The Director, Special Areas Branch, Foreign Economic Administration.
- (6) The Director, Office of Strategic Services.
- (7) The Office of Scientific Research and Development.

b. The following were the functions and responsibilities of the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, which, in relation to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, were implemented and coordinated by the staff agencies of the Special Sections Sub-Division:

- (1) To receive, approve, and coordinate all requests of British and United States governmental departments for intelligence of military or political significance which became available as Allied Forces advanced in the area under the authority of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, exclusive of combat intelligence, normal technical intelligence, and counter-intelligence.
- (2) To assign priorities to such requests.
- (3) To arrange for the preparation of intelligence folders, for the preparation of adequate plans, and for the provision of expert personnel for technical investigations on the spot.
- (4) To make the necessary arrangements with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, for the administration, transportation, and billeting of the technical teams.
- (5) To arrange for dissemination of the resulting intelligence to the British and United States Departments concerned.

As pointed out in Chapter 2, Section 10, paragraph 29 b, the Special Sections Sub-Division was developed as the necessary staff agency to control and coordinate the examination and exploitation of intelligence targets by the various intelligence teams operating in the European Theater

of Operations. Due to the late date in combat operations on which it was organized, the full measure of its operations was not developed until the post-hostilities period.²

58. The Occupational Intelligence Training Section² formulated and coordinated the plans for the training of intelligence personnel who were to be utilized in the occupation of Germany during post-hostilities. The work of this section was discontinued at the close of the war due to lack of student personnel.

59. The Intelligence Target "T" Sub-Division was responsible for the movement and control of all Allied investigators of intelligence targets in occupied or liberated countries in Europe, and the coordination of all Allied intelligence agencies with respect to examination and exploitation of these intelligence targets. All staff agencies within the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, which made intelligence investigations in the field were required to obtain clearance through this sub-division before they could conduct investigations. Outside Allied intelligence agencies which made such investigations also had to make their requests to this sub-division for clearance to allow them to conduct their investigations. Particularly close coordination was maintained with the Air and Naval Targets Sub-Division, with the representatives from the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, and with the British military government representatives who were attached to this sub-division. Other important functions of the "T" Sub-Division were the preparation of reports on disposal addresses of targets evacuated from original locations, the maintenance of assessment records of targets visited by investigators, and the preparation of target lists and dossiers. In the latter function, the "T" Sub-Division received much information from the Combined Advanced Field Teams.

a. The Combined Advanced Field Team² system was formed by the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee to expedite and provide a more efficient means of target exploitation. Under this system, approximately seventy assessors, divided into seven teams, were attached to each army group, each team specializing in the exploitation of a number of technical items. It was the mission of these teams to assess targets rapidly and to call for investigating teams when warranted. These investigating teams in turn submitted reports of their investigations to the "T" Sub-Division. The reports were indexed and filed and were available to all investigating agencies proceeding into the field, thereby preventing duplication of investigations.

60. The Naval Target Sub-Division^{2,6} supervised and coordinated the activities of the naval technical intelligence organizations in the field. This Sub-Division received the latest and most accurate intelligence data from Allied naval authorities. It coordinated this data with target dossiers from other intelligence departments and disseminated this information to the proper interested agencies. The Sub-Division made arrangements with the "T" Sub-Division so that naval investigators and specialists were given the opportunity to seize and exploit intelligence targets. Files and records were maintained of the activities and results of these investigating teams. Liaison was maintained with all the various technical naval intelligence agencies as well as with the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, and with the Combined Advanced Field Teams.

61. The Air Target Sub-Division^{2,7} was not organized until 27 April 1945 and consequently its functions and responsibilities were based more on the theoretical necessity for such an agency rather than its actual performance during combat operations. It coordinated with the "T" Tar-

get Sub-Division the movements of air intelligence personnel to the three army groups by contact with Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, United States Strategic Air Forces, Air Ministry and other air agencies that sent investigators into the field, either on pre-selected air intelligence targets or targets of opportunity. It passed on to the "T" Sub-Division such intelligence as came to the Air Target Sub-Division, and which might not have reached "T" Sub-Division through other sources. The Air Target Sub-Division maintained liaison with the A-2 Air Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. It coordinated the movement of British personnel making investigations of air targets through liaison with the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee and Air Ministry. Similarly, movements of American personnel were coordinated through liaison with Headquarters, United States Strategic Air Forces, or other echelons of the Strategic Air Forces.

62. The Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section² had practically no existence during combat operations as it was not formed until 1 May 1945. It was organized to meet the necessity for an intelligence agency to coordinate the activities of the various intelligence exploitation agencies interested in the examination of enemy personnel. This section assembled data from all German scientists and industrialists likely to be of interest to these exploiting agencies. It received requests from interested intelligence agencies for enemy personnel that these agencies desired to exploit. It coordinated arrangements for detention and exploitation of this personnel. This included making decisions on the dispatch of German technical personnel to the United States or United Kingdom. Camp Dustbin, a detention agency for important enemy personnel, was set up at Versailles under the administration and control of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. It was at this camp that the Enemy Exploitation Section controlled and coordinated the interrogation of detained enemy personnel by investigating agencies. Personnel detained at the camp were brought in at the requests of various investigating agencies. In cases where only one agency was interested in a particular person, such person was turned over to that agency for exploitation. Where, however, a number of agencies were interested, the Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section coordinated the demands of the several agencies.

63. The Scientific Intelligence Advisory Section² acted in an advisory capacity regarding the acquisition and exploitation of intelligence and information concerning scientific and technological processes and concepts which the Germans had produced. It also gave advice on the scientific and technological requirements of the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee in the field, and coordinated the subject matter on all intelligence interrogations in the scientific and technological field conducted in Germany during the period of control by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. The section coordinated and received requests for advice on scientific intelligence from all staff agencies in Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. It also provided scientific intelligence advice and assistance to these staff agencies from its own resources or from those of other agencies or governmental departments located in Europe, the United Kingdom or the United States. The Scientific Advisory Section was greatly hampered in fulfilling its functions during combat operations due to the lack of trained scientific personnel, clerical help, and its relatively weak organization within the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

64. The Japanese Intelligence Section² was assigned the responsibility for Japanese intelligence in the European Theater. It was charged with locating and obtaining material which might be operation-

ally useful to the Allied military authorities conducting the war in the Pacific. In carrying out its functions and responsibilities, the section requested information on Japanese personalities from all Allied intelligence agencies. Intelligence objectives were formulated and promulgated at army groups within the European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operations. Liaison was maintained with the following:

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force Missions to Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Luxembourg.

Staff agencies of the British Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry.

Netherlands Military Mission to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Force and Field Interrogation Units.

Commander, United States Naval Forces in Europe (Intelligence Officer) and Field Intelligence Teams.

Commander, United States Naval Forces, France (Intelligence Officer).

Commander, United States Naval Forces, Germany (Intelligence Officer).

Commander, United States Naval Technical Mission, Europe.

United States Strategic Air Forces, Director of Intelligence.

Air Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

Joint Target Group, Washington and London.

Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee.

Office of Strategic Services, Paris and London.

Office of Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations, United States Army (Intelligence Section).

French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Liaison Section).

French Ministry of National Defense.

Direction Generale d'Etudes et de Recherche

French Securite Militaire.

Field Intelligence Staff, Foreign Economic Administration and Ministry of Economic Warfare.

United States Embassies, in England, France, and the Netherlands.

Intelligence Staffs - 21, 12 and 6 Army Groups.

United States Minister to Luxembourg.

Intelligence Staffs, - 1, 3, 7, and 9 Armies.

2 Tactical Air Force (Intelligence Officer).

Special Operations (Executive).

Allied Force Headquarters (G-2 Division).

Hough Team from Office of Chief Engineer, War Department.

Military Intelligence Research Section, London.

SECTION 16

THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SUB-DIVISION

65. a. The Naval Intelligence Sub-Division² consisted of personnel who were members of the staff of the Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Force attached for duty with the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. For maintenance, rations and quarters they came under Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, for discipline under Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Force, and for duties under both these commands. The staff of this sub-division was integrated with that of sub-divisions in the G-2 Division in which they worked. There were naval personnel in the various sections of the Operational Intelligence Sub-Division, in the Censorship Section, "T" Sub-Division, etc.

b. The functions of the Naval Intelligence Sub-Division² were to give advice and information on all naval intelligence matters to all other sub-divisions of G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. It extracted from all other sub-divisions of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, intelligence of interest to all naval authorities including the Admiralty, Commander of Naval Forces in Europe, the Home Commands (British), and Allied Naval Continental Expeditionary Force with all its subordinate forces and commands.

SECTION 17

THE EXECUTIVE SUB-DIVISION

66. The Executive Sub-Division² was responsible for the supervision of all administrative matters of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and for coordinating all matters affecting more than one sub-division of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. It was responsible for all administration concerning the personnel of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, for reproduction and dissemination of all publications by the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and for the provision of all supplies and services required by this Division.

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CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following conclusions and recommendations based upon material presented in the preceding three chapters are concerned with the American side of the intelligence activities in the European Theater of Operations. However, British interests are discussed wherever these interests affected the American participation in intelligence activities in the European Theater of Operations.

SECTION 18

CONCLUSIONS

The Theater General Board concludes:

1. That the failure of the United States to establish and maintain a highly developed intelligence organization, world wide in scope, resulted initially in the lack of intelligence data, and trained personnel necessary for the conduct of operations in the European Theater.
2. That British influence was predominant in the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, during the planning phase of the campaign in Europe and continued in only slightly lesser degree throughout the operation on the Continent.
3. That subsequent to the invasion of France, the greater portion of the tactical intelligence furnished the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, came from agencies operating in the field. During this period, the United States furnished its rightful share of this type of intelligence.
4. That better results would have been obtained from the Office of Strategic Services had this agency been under direct control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and had its efforts been more closely coordinated with those of the military forces.
5. That the magnitude of the duties and responsibilities of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, required a large flexible organization with facilities to conduct long-range intelligence planning concurrently with current operations, and capable of producing intelligence commensurate with, and necessary to, its level of operations.
6. That the control and coordination of civil censorship should be the responsibility of the highest level of command in a theater of operations, and this responsibility should not be delegated to a lower tactical headquarters.
7. That an agency for formulating and co-ordinating the policies relative to intelligence activities in the occupation of conquered and liberated countries should be included in the intelligence staff of the highest level of command within a theater of operations.
8. That better results would have been obtained in intelligence derived from the examination and exploitation of enemy equipment and materiel, and captured enemy technicians, scientists, and technologists, had:


- a. The initial organization of the G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, provided a staff agency to control and co-ordinate the exploitation of this type of intelligence.
- b. All agencies in the European Theater of Operations with the mission of investigating and exploiting intelligence targets been placed under the direct control of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- c. Sufficient scientists, technicians, and technologists, trained in the exploitation of intelligence targets, been provided by the United States.

SECTION 19

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Theater General Board recommends:

1. That an intelligence organization in the United States be formed to operate in time of peace as well as in time of war, to produce military intelligence world wide in scope, and to provide the trained intelligence personnel necessary for its operations. Such an organization should be prepared in the eventuality of war to provide the military intelligence data and trained intelligence personnel necessary for the conduct of intelligence operations and planning in any theater in which United States forces might operate.
2. That in the future, any United States expeditionary force should be provided with an intelligence staff which is capable of producing intelligence commensurate with, and necessary to, its level of operations, and which has adequate facilities to conduct long range planning in all phases of intelligence concurrently with its routine operations.
3. That the control and co-ordination of civil censorship be retained as a responsibility of the highest level of command in the theater of operations and not delegated to a lower tactical headquarters.
4. That an agency for formulating and co-ordinating policies relative to the intelligence activities in the occupation of conquered and liberated countries be included in the intelligence staff of the highest level of command within a theater of operations.
5. That an agency be included in the intelligence staff of the highest level of command within a theater of operations to co-ordinate and control the exploitation of intelligence targets.
6. That the provision be made to include technicians and scientists trained in the exploitation of intelligence targets in any United States intelligence system that may be formed.



INITIAL ORGANIZATION G-2 DIVISION, SHAEF
PUBLISHED AS OF 22 FEB. 1944




CHART #2

